Understanding the American Right

“Little” Lebanon

Lebanon is a tiny little country, smaller than Connecticut, with just over 4 million people and yet little Lebanon has played an outsize historical and contemporary role. The old testament refers to the Land of Canaan stretching south from Lebanon to the 'brook of Egypt' and east to the Jordan river valley, that is, much of what is today called the Levant including Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian territories and western parts of Jordan and Syria (it was Greater Syria that was home to the first Christians). 

Canaanites have historically been Semitic speaking peoples, this language family includes Arabic, Hebrew, Amharic (spoken in Ethiopia) and Aramaic (what Jesus spoke). So not only Jesus but also Abraham, Ishmael, Moses, John the Baptist, Hammurabi and the Virgin Mary were all Semites. Long before Jesus, the Phoenicians, an enterprising maritime trading culture and one of the earliest civilizations, flourished along the western Mediterranean coast of the 'fertile crescent' for over 1000 years. 
 From one of the Phoenician capitals, Byblos (Jubeil in Arabic), in what is today Lebanon, came, debatably, the world's first phonetic alphabet which was appropriated by the Greeks and enabled the symbol-sound correspondence you take for granted as you are reading now. The word Byblos transmogrified in Latin as Papyrus (papyrus was exported from the port of Byblos to Egypt) is where the English words bible, paper and the prefix biblio- come from.
Centuries of Roman rule came to an end when the 7th century Arab expansion brought Islam and Arabic language and culture to the Levant, and was in turn followed by Mongols, Mamluks and then centuries of Ottoman rule. After World War I and the Ottoman collapse, Lebanon was mandated to France in 1923 as part of the State of Syria. Under the French, an already vibrant Beirut blossomed into a beautiful, cosmopolitan, liberal, laissez-faire “Paris of the Middle East,” distinctive because of its predominantly Maronite Christian population.
 By 1943, with France occupied by Nazi Germany, Lebanon's independence was recognized and the last allied troops left in 1946.

The birth of Israel in Palestine in 1948 and the ensuing Arab-Israeli War saw major battles and bloodshed in south Lebanon as a coalition of Arab states tried to liquidate Zionism only to be humiliated and pushed back by the nascent, small but fierce Israeli army and state.
In 1975, tensions between the Lebanon's Christians and the growing Muslim community exploded into a civil war that would last 15 years and devastate the whole country, bring US and Israeli boots to Lebanese soil and halve economic productivity - turning “Beirut” into an international byword for an unrelentingly violent urban war zone.
 In 1983, a year after Israel invaded Lebanon to crush Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which had found safe-haven in South Lebanon, suicide bombers under the banner of the group Islamic Jihad detonated truck bombs at the Beirut barracks of US and French military forces, “inventing” modern suicide bombing as a tactic by killing 241 American servicemen in what was the deadliest single attack on Americans overseas since World War II (and the deadliest prior to 9/11).
In 1989, the National Reconciliation, or Taif Accords, restructured Lebanon's French-shepherded, Christian-privileging National Pact of 1943 which had institutionalized Lebanon's unique confessional system, even-ing the Christian-Muslim political representation balance at 6:6 (it had been 6:5 based on the 1932 census). Reconstruction of war-battered Lebanon began in fits and starts and the militant Islamist resistance group Hezbollah began to emerge in the early 1990s in response to the continuing Israeli occupation of South Lebanon which ended abruptly in 2000 with unilateral and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all but the disputed and uninhabited 25 square km area known as Shebaa Farms.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah
Israeli withdrawal was as ignominious for the Israelis as it was a spectacular PR coup for Hezbollah, vaulting their leader Hassan Nasrallah to Arab superstardom for sending the supposedly invincible Israeli army home with its tail between its legs. In 2005, in the wake of the February 14 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri who had been an outspoken critic of Syrian corruption and domination of Lebanon, the 'Independence Intifada' rose up. Intifada,which conjures Palestinian suicide bombers in the minds of the American masses, was assiduously redubbed the 'Cedar Revolution' by the Bush administration as its freedom and democracy agenda sought to embrace the ejection of Syria. Culminating on March 14, 2005 when some one million Lebanese (a quarter of the population of the entire country) converged on Martyr's Square - Syria finally, likewise humiliated, withdrew after nearly 30 years of occupation.
Lebanon Today
After the civil war (1975-1990) Lebanon never did regain its role as the economic powerhouse of the Middle East (Dubai has largely taken over this title). Today it is marked by its liberal, laissez-faire culture that stands in contrast to its more traditional and conservative Arab neighbors. It is a country whose people, perhaps more so than any others except the Palestinians themselves, have been ravaged by Zionism and the Israeli army (most recently in the July War of 2006, which was followed by the breath-taking downtown redevelopment of Solidere), nursing an acute bitterness and sense of victimhood. It is a country where many taxi drivers, waiters and store clerks speak English, French and Arabic fluently. It is the sectarian country par excellence. With 18 official sects, it is about 65% Muslim (27% Sunni, 27% Shia, 5% Druze and other Muslim offshoots) and about 35% Christian (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, etc.). Lebanon has a stronger track record of democracy and free press than any other Arab country.
Lebanese food is the undisputed best in the Middle East.
Lebanese Cuisine
This is a far cry from Saudi Arabia, there is no desert but rather the highest proportion of cultivable land in the Arab world, alcohol is widely available and Lebanon's beaches are bikini-fests and Beirut's nightlife and party scene rivals European capitals.  It is among the plastic surgery capitals of the world, where jaw-droppingly gorgeous, tan olive-skinned women with disarming joie de vivre, take being beautiful as an earnest national duty. And they succeed in droves, so much so that it is dizzyingly disorienting until you adjust to 'average' being so far, well, above average. Be forewarned though, despite dressing (at least in well-to-do areas of Beirut) as liberated, or more so, than say, French women, Lebanon remains a conservative society by European standards and most young people do not have casual relationships and do not move away from home until they are married.
Lebanese singer Miriam Fares
Lebanon has a vibrant private sector, driven by networks of personal connections or wasta in Arabic, that has proven itself resilient time and time again through wars and political turmoil, and Lebanese are world-renowned for their cutthroat business acumen - the richest man in the world Lebanese-Mexican Carlos Slim is among the 10-15 million-strong Lebanese diaspora. Remittances from abroad of over $8 billion/yr account for 1/5 of the Lebanese economy, its banking secrecy laws are similar to Switzerland's and Lebanon has the largest proportion of skilled labor among the Arab states. Highest non-oil GDP in MENA (only Abu Dhabi is more expensive in the MENA region).
Lebanese singers dominate the list of the wealthiest Arab pop stars, and despite its relatively miniscule population, according to Arabian Business magazine, 87 out of the top 500 most influential Arabs are of Lebanese origin, more than any other Arab country (67 are Saudi and 58 Egyptian, but little Lebanon has, respectively, only 1/7th and 1/20th their populations!). This is not to say, all is rosy in Lebanon, it has fallen far from being the "Paris of the Middle East," some 30% of the population lives at or below the poverty line, with Shia communities in south Beirut (known as the Dahiya) and South Lebanon suffer disproportionately (and are also the fastest growing, but perhaps the most dynamic and upwardly mobile demographic), and of course, like everywhere else in the Middle East youth unemployment is disturbingly high.
It is also home to Hezbollah, widely seen as the most efficient and capable non-state actor in the world and designated as a terrorist organization in the US for its uncompromising militancy towards Israel (though missiles and bombings have abated, don't be fooled, a Israel-Hezbllah propaganda and intel war is very active and always tends to heat up in the summer. Despite all its potential, Lebanon has been wracked not only by civil war and crippling disunity, it has historically been a pawn in big power games, infecting most Lebanese with a profound and unshakable cynicism. The student of Lebanon cannot help but wonder, if Lebanese had quality governance and could unify, might they be running the world?
For a poignant, funny, artistic slice of 20-something life of Beirutis today watch a few of the 5-minute episodes of Beirut I Love You.

Syria - Lebanon Border. Masnaa, Lebanon July 20, 2012

Al Jazeera's Zeina Khodr is in Masnaa on the Lebanon-Syria border. She reports on the latest developments:

Syria's Alawite Refuge

A Letter From Tartus
The Syrian city of Tartus on the shores of the Mediterranean. (Khaled Al Hariri / Courtesy Reuters)
On a recent Sunday afternoon, the Syrian port city of Tartus buzzed in the summer heat. Car showrooms displayed lines of new vehicles. Markets full of clothes, furniture, and household knicknacks bustled with customers. Clouds of nargileh smoke wafted from hookah pipes at the see-and-be-seen restaurants lining sandy Mediterranean beaches. Yachts bobbed indifferently in the port.
This Middle Eastern haven, however, lies just 60 miles west of Homs, the battle-broken city that is the center of gravity in the civil war that has shattered Syria, killing more than 16,000 people and displacing a quarter of a million more. Tartus, though, has become a refuge for the country's minority Alawi Shiite population. "As an Alawi, I don't really care about Bashar al-Assad," says 30-year-old Majed, referring to Syria's president, who is also Alawi. "The only thing that concerns me is security." 
Eight months ago, after losing his job and fearing for his safety, Majed escaped Homs. (Like others interviewed for this article, Majed chose to keep his last name private for security reasons.) In Tartus, he has found work as a telecommunications salesman. "Everyone thinks we defend the regime and the authorities, but the opposition has given us no choice but to flee to the coast," he says. "It's like I'm not even in the Middle East here, I feel so secure."
Similar sentiments are easy to find in Tartus. Fayez, a 35-year-old import-export business owner, also abandoned Homs last year after opposition fighters operating under the banner of the Free Syrian Army kidnapped his cousins and wrote "Get out" on the door of his home. "Revolutionaries," Fayez describes them sarcastically, holding up his fingers in bitter air quotes. "Tartus is my new home. I don't ever intend to leave," he says. "In the end, Bashar al-Assad will go and our children will be left, and we have to defend their future here."
Eighteen months of fighting have hardened both men's sectarian resolve. In their view, Alawites are under attack by a Sunni majority, which uses its religious identity as an organizing principle for mobilizing the militias operating under the Free Syrian Army umbrella. In turn, the coastal Sahel region is the only safe haven, and this stretch of land -- encompassing the port cities of Latakia, Baniyas, Jableh, and Tartus, and the mountains separating them from the rest of Syria's plains -- must be protected against Sunni encroachment at all costs.
Far removed from the shabiha, Assad's vigilante militias notorious for carrying out the regime's crackdown against the uprising, these men in the Sahel are neither fanatic nor armed. But they represent a demographic force creating another de facto divide in the country. As fighting takes place along Syria's central artery running northward from Homs to Idlib, Alawites are increasingly setting up shop in the Sahel, looking to cordon themselves off from the chaos that they believe will come as Assad's grip on the country weakens.
In several conversations, Alawites said that thousands of families have relocated to the coast. Others spoke of friends and family members who have not yet moved but have purchased homes there in anticipation of a shift in fortunes. Although the real figure is impossible to determine, visits to Damascus, Homs, and Tartus indicated that such numbers are plausible. Official tallies -- from the UN agencies operating inside Syria, for instance -- are nonexistent.
Such movement could be an early harbinger of territorial entrenchments of Syria's sectarian fault lines. "At this point, the regime is not looking at itself as a small state within Syria," says one Alawi academic who lives in both Damascus and Latakia. "It wants all of Syria, and it will stay that way until the last possible moment." Alawites talk of a return to the coast is specious, he says, the product of a regime "game" of hyping threats in order to instill fear in minorities. Still, he adds, "Just like the weapons game, the sectarian game is a dangerous one. People are hearing rhetoric like, 'We want to annihilate Alawis. We want their deaths.' You never know if it will pass a point at which you can't stop it, you lose control."
That fear is rooted in the community's historical marginalization. Throughout centuries of Mamluk and Ottoman rule, Alawites, a heterodox offshoot of Shia Islam, largely confined themselves to the mountains east of Latakia. Aside from tiny minorities in the villages around Homs and Hama, they emerged from their "wild hills" only occasionally to work as menial laborers. After World War I, French mandate authorities codified these isolationist impulses, creating a sovereign Alawi territory extending from Latakia to Tartus in 1920. Though Alawi leaders initially cheered their region as a bulwark against Sunni domination of the interior, even French protection could not make the state viable. Alawites constituted a majority of the population, but city-based Sunni and Christian communities lagged behind by only a third, possessed far greater wealth and education, and were strongly in favor of union with Damascus. By 1937, the experiment had failed; the state was incorporated into modern-day Syria.
Alawites eventually entered the Syrian mainstream via new national military and educational institutions in the cities, assuming posts in the full spectrum of professions: public service, the security forces, academia, and business. Eventually, that process put Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite air force officer, in position to seize the presidency in a 1970 coup. Today, Alawites constitute about 12 percent of Syria's population of 22 million, primarily concentrated on the coast but with significant numbers in Damascus and Homs. The mainstreaming process has not been even or complete. Like his father, Bashar al-Assad has kept the top ranks in the military and security services reserved for well-connected Alawites. Meanwhile, fueled in large part by a stifling ban on discussion of sectarian issues, identity within Syrian society remains strongly determined by sect.
Today in Damascus, people living in Alawi districts such as Mezze 86, a middle-class neighborhood, are weighing their future. Ask them how they feel about the city, and it is not uncommon to hear a refrain repeated: "Damascus is my maskan, my residence, but Latakia is my ma'man." Ma'man translates roughly to "home" but derives from a root meaning "security." It means, more precisely, "the place where I am safe." Khalil, a medical student born and raised in Mezze 86, is only in his 20s, but he repeats it, too. "I have friends, and everything is comfortable for me here," he explained to me in May, "but something inside me still feels alienated." For now, he chooses to remain in Damascus to finish his studies, but he keeps one eye trained on encroaching opposition forces and the other on the coast. "If it becomes dangerous for us Alawis, then we can't stay here."
But although the Alawites are minorities, they hold disproportionate power, which makes it unlikely that they would accept a Sunni leadership without a fight. "If Assad leaves tomorrow morning, the war in Syria will not end," says Firas Abi Ali, an analyst at the London-based risk consultancy Executive Analysis. "A core of Alawis would continue fighting. The conventional army would become a lot weaker, since so many powers are centered in the presidential office. But you would end up with a very well-armed core still fighting with tanks, special forces, possibly airplanes."
The most likely scenario, Abi Ali says, is that rebel forces would concentrate on Daraa, Deir al-Zour, the Homs-Idlib corridor, and rural areas around Aleppo and Damascus, while government forces could continue to hold Aleppo, Damascus, and the coastal areas. As the capabilities of the two sides equalize, fighting would gradually progress into conventional warfare, with much of the Alawi civilian population forced toward the coast.
The problem is what comes afterward. As history has shown once before, the odds are stacked against the viability of a state in the mountains of the sea. For one, there is the coast's restive Sunni population. Even Latakia, commonly cast as an Alawi stronghold, is more than 50 percent Sunni province-wide and more than 70 percent Sunni in the city itself. Baniyas, too, is evenly split. Overwhelming force has thus far been sufficient to quell protests in both cities, but, according to one Latakia-based activist, even mountain areas such as Jabal Akrad and Haffeh are beginning to see Free Syrian Army activity. Many Sunnis of means are leaving the city for Turkey, including the activist's own family, fearing a final showdown there as Alawis retreat.
A fledgling "state within a state" would then face the same economic dilemmas that doomed it a century ago. Import-export businesses fuel the economies of Tartus and Latakia, and those would suffer if a de facto partition develops further, since merchants would be unable to move their goods to market in Damascus and Aleppo across a hostile border. Although there is some discussion among the Alawi elite that they might find oil and gas on the coast offshore, according to Abi Ali, sectors such as tourism and agriculture are not enough to sustain an Alawi state on their own. The entity's regional neighbors, wary of their own domestic secessionist movements, would be loath to recognize it.
With these odds in mind, Alawi elites are divided on the future of the coastal mountains, seeing little choice but to fight for control of the entire country. According to one high-ranking Alawi general in Homs with direct knowledge of the thinking in Damascus, the regime leadership is not formulating any plans for separation. At the same time, he says, the demographic changes are happening organically on their own, driven by the violence in central Syria and fear of the unknown in Damascus. He has already sent his own family coastward, citing the area's security and environment as "suitable for us."
"We're Alawis, so we can't live among the other groups," he says. "We have a different, more open culture, so the coast is best for us. This is our only option."
As the war grinds on, other possibilities may become more attractive to the general. These are still the early days of Alawi migration, a relatively mild flow that could be stanched if a political deal convinces enough of the population that they would have a stake in the country's future government. But Syria's chronically squabbling opposition figures have so far failed to make such overtures, while Assad's forces, fighting what they consider an existential battle, appear unlikely to put down their weapons voluntarily. Whether those forces choose to make their final battle in Damascus or retreat to the mountains, the stage in Syria is set for a long war and deepening social divisions.
For Majed, settling comfortably into his new home in Tartus, there is no going back. "It's true that there aren't the right ingredients for a state, but the Syrian coast is basically the center of gravity for the sect," he says. "If the war continues in Syria, I'll be among the supporters of separation. There is enough blood."
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Fearful of a nuclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria


OP-ED Charles P. Blair March 1, 2012
Fearful of a nuclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria BY CHARLES P. BLAIR | 1 MARCH 2012 Article Highlights Syria has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapons programs in the world and may also possess offensive biological weapons. Longstanding terrorist groups and newly arrived Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters from Iraq have been active in Syria during that country's recent insurgency. The United States and regional powers -- including Saudi Arabia and Iran -- need to start planning now to keep Syria's WMD out of terrorist hands if the Assad regime falls. As possible military action against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program looms large in the public arena, far more international concern should be directed toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the Syrian uprising began more than a year ago, few predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter toward collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appears inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see similarities with Libya's civil war, during which persistent fears revolved around terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's use of them against insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded. But the Libyan chemical stockpile consisted of several tons of aging mustard gas leaking from a half-dozen canisters that would have been impossible to utilize as weapons. Syria likely has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapon programs in the world. Moreover, Syria may also possess an offensive biological weapons capability that Libya did not. While it is uncertain whether the Syrian regime would consider using WMD against its domestic opponents, Syrian insurgents, unlike many of their Libyan counterparts, are increasingly sectarian and radicalized; indeed, many observers fear the uprising is being "hijacked" by jihadists. Terrorist groups active in the Syrian uprising have already demonstrated little compunction about the acquisition and use of WMD. In short, should Syria devolve into full-blown civil-war, the security of its WMD should be of profound concern, as sectarian insurgents and Islamist terrorist groups may stand poised to seize chemical and perhaps even biological weapons. An enormous unconventional arsenal. Syria's chemical weapons stockpile is thought to be massive PDF. One of only eight nations that is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention -- an arms control agreement that outlaws the production, possession, and use of chemical weapons -- Syria has a chemical arsenal that includes several hundred tons of blistering agents along with likely large stockpiles of deadly nerve agents, including VX, the most toxic of all chemical weapons. At least four large chemical weapon production facilities exist. Additionally, Syria likely stores its deadly chemical weapons at dozens of facilities throughout the fractious country. In contrast to Libya's unusable chemical stockpile, analysts emphasize that Syrian chemical agents are weaponized and deliverable. Insurgents and terrorists with past or present connections to the military might feasibly be able to effectively disseminate chemical agents over large populations. (The Global Security Newswire recently asserted that "[t]he Assad regime is thought to possess between 100 and 200 Scud missiles carrying warheads loaded with sarin nerve agent. The government is also believed to have several hundred tons of sarin agent and mustard gas stockpiled that could be used in air-dropped bombs and artillery shells, according to information compiled by the James Martin Center.") Given its robust chemical weapons arsenal and its perceived need to deter Israel, Syria has long been suspected of having an active biological weapons program. Despite signing the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention in 1972 (the treaty prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons), Syria never ratified the treaty. Some experts contend that any Syrian biological weapons program has not moved beyond the research and development phase. Still, Syria's biotechnical infrastructure undoubtedly has the capability PDF to develop numerous biological weapon agents. After Israel destroyed a clandestine Syrian nuclear reactor in September 2007, Damascus may have accelerated its chemical and biological weapons programs. It's hard to guard WMD when a government collapses. Although the United States and its allies are reportedly monitoring Syria's chemical weapons, recent history warns that securing them from theft or transfer is an extraordinary challenge. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, more than 330 metric tons of military-grade high explosives vanished from Iraq's Al-Qaqaa military installation. Almost 200 tons of the most powerful of Iraq's high-explosives, HMX -- used by some states to detonate nuclear weapons -- was under International Atomic Energy Agency seal. Many tons of Al-Qaqaa's sealed HMX reportedly went missing in the early days of the war in Iraq. Forensic tests later revealed that some of these military-grade explosives were subsequently employed against US and coalition forces. Even with a nationwide presence of 200,000 coalition troops, several other sensitive military sites were also looted, including Iraq's main nuclear complex, Tuwaitha. Should centralized authority crumble in Syria, it seems highly unlikely that the country's 50 chemical storage and manufacturing facilities -- and, possibly, biological weapon repositories -- can be secured. The US Defense Department recently estimated that it would take more than 75,000 US military personnel to guard Syria's chemical weapons. This is, of course, if they could arrive before any WMD were transferred or looted -- a highly unlikely prospect. Complicating any efforts to secure Syria's WMD, post-Assad, are its porous borders PDF. With Syria's government distracted by internal revolt and US forces now fully out of Iraq, it is plausible that stolen chemical or biological weapons could find their way across the Syrian border into Iraq. Similarly, Syrian WMD could be smuggled into southern Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, Israel, and, potentially, the United States and Europe. At least six formal terrorist organizations have long maintained personnel within Syria. Three of these groups PDF -- Hamas, Hizbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad -- have already attempted to acquire or use chemical or biological agents, or both. Perhaps more troubling, Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters from Iraq have streamed into Syria, acting, in part, on orders from Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. In the past, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq fighters attempted to use chemical weapons, most notably attacks that sought to release large clouds of chlorine gas. The entry of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups into the Syrian crisis underscores its increasingly sectarian manifestation. Nearly 40 percent of Syria's population consists of members of minority communities. Syria's ruling Alawite regime, a branch of Shia Islam, is considered heretical by many of Syria's majority Sunni Muslims -- even those who are not jihadists. Alawites, Druze, Kurds, and Christians could all become targets for WMD-armed Sunni jihadists. Similarly, Shiite radicals could conceivably employ WMD agents against Syria's Sunnis. Religious fanaticism and WMD. Evidence of growing religious fanaticism is also reflected in recent Syrian suicide attacks. Since last December, at least five suicide attacks occurred in Syria. In the 40 years preceding, only two suicide attacks were recorded. Al Qaeda-linked mujahidin are believed to be responsible for all of these recent attacks. Civil wars are often the most violent and unpredictable manifestations of war. With expanding sectarian divisions, the use of seized WMD in Syria's uprising is plausible. To the extent that religious extremists believe that they are doing God's bidding, fundamentally any action they undertake is justified, no matter how abhorrent, since the "divine" ends are believed to legitimize PDF the means. The situation in Syria is unprecedented. Never before has a WMD-armed country fallen into civil war. All states in the region stand poised to lose if these weapons find their way outside of Syria. The best possible outcome, in terms of controlling Syria's enormous WMD arsenal, would be for Assad to maintain power, but such an outcome seems increasingly implausible. And there is painfully little evidence that democratic forces are likely to take over in Syria. Even if they do eventually triumph, it will take months or years to consolidate control over the entire country. If chaos ensues in Syria, the United States cannot go it alone in securing hundreds of tons of Syrian WMD. Regional leaders -- including some, such as Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran, that are now backing the insurgency and the regime, respectively -- must come together and begin planning to avert a dispersion of Syrian chemical or biological weapons that would threaten everyone, of any political or religious persuasion, in the Middle East and around the world.