Understanding the American Right

U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings

WASHINGTON — Even as the United States poured billions of dollars into foreign military programs and anti-terrorism campaigns, a small core of American government-financed organizations were promoting democracy in authoritarian Arab states.
Andrea Bruce for The New York Times
Michael Simon, who worked on targeting for the Barack Obama presidential campaign of 2008, spoke last week to members of the Egyptian Democratic Academy in Cairo.
Multimedia
The money spent on these programs was minute compared with efforts led by the Pentagon. But as American officials and others look back at the uprisings of the Arab Spring, they are seeing that the United States’ democracy-building campaigns played a bigger role in fomenting protests than was previously known, with key leaders of the movements having been trained by the Americans in campaigning, organizing through new media tools and monitoring elections.
A number of the groups and individuals directly involved in the revolts and reforms sweeping the region, including the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and grass-roots activists like Entsar Qadhi, a youth leader in Yemen, received training and financing from groups like the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House, a nonprofit human rights organization based in Washington, according to interviews in recent weeks and American diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks.
The work of these groups often provoked tensions between the United States and many Middle Eastern leaders, who frequently complained that their leadership was being undermined, according to the cables.
The Republican and Democratic institutes are loosely affiliated with the Republican and Democratic Parties. They were created by Congress and are financed through the National Endowment for Democracy, which was set up in 1983 to channel grants for promoting democracy in developing nations. The National Endowment receives about $100 million annually from Congress. Freedom House also gets the bulk of its money from the American government, mainly from the State Department.
No one doubts that the Arab uprisings are home grown, rather than resulting from “foreign influence,” as alleged by some Middle Eastern leaders.
“We didn’t fund them to start protests, but we did help support their development of skills and networking,” said Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy, a Washington-based advocacy and research group. “That training did play a role in what ultimately happened, but it was their revolution. We didn’t start it.”
Some Egyptian youth leaders attended a 2008 technology meeting in New York, where they were taught to use social networking and mobile technologies to promote democracy. Among those sponsoring the meeting were Facebook, Google, MTV, Columbia Law School and the State Department.
“We learned how to organize and build coalitions,” said Bashem Fathy, a founder of the youth movement that ultimately drove the Egyptian uprisings. Mr. Fathy, who attended training with Freedom House, said, “This certainly helped during the revolution.”
Ms. Qadhi, the Yemeni youth activist, attended American training sessions in Yemen.
“It helped me very much because I used to think that change only takes place by force and by weapons,” she said.
But now, she said, it is clear that results can be achieved with peaceful protests and other nonviolent means.
But some members of the activist groups complained in interviews that the United States was hypocritical for helping them at the same time that it was supporting the governments they sought to change.
“While we appreciated the training we received through the NGOs sponsored by the U.S. government, and it did help us in our struggles, we are also aware that the same government also trained the state security investigative service, which was responsible for the harassment and jailing of many of us,” said Mr. Fathy, the Egyptian activist.
Interviews with officials of the nongovernmental groups and a review of diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks show that the democracy programs were constant sources of tension between the United States and many Arab governments.
The cables, in particular, show how leaders in the Middle East and North Africa viewed these groups with deep suspicion, and tried to weaken them. Today the work of these groups is among the reasons that governments in turmoil claim that Western meddling was behind the uprisings, with some officials noting that leaders like Ms. Qadhi were trained and financed by the United States.
Diplomatic cables report how American officials frequently assured skeptical governments that the training was aimed at reform, not promoting revolutions.
Last year, for example, a few months before national elections in Bahrain, officials there barred a representative of the National Democratic Institute from entering the country.
In Bahrain, officials worried that the group’s political training “disproportionately benefited the opposition,” according to a January 2010 cable.
In Yemen, where the United States has been spending millions on an anti-terrorism program, officials complained that American efforts to promote democracy amounted to “interference in internal Yemeni affairs.”
But nowhere was the opposition to the American groups stronger than in Egypt.
Egypt, whose government receives $1.5 billion annually in military and economic aid from the United States, viewed efforts to promote political change with deep suspicion, even outrage.
Hosni Mubarak, then Egypt’s president, was “deeply skeptical of the U.S. role in democracy promotion,” said a diplomatic cable from the United States Embassy in Cairo dated Oct. 9, 2007.
At one time the United States financed political reform groups by channeling money through the Egyptian government.
But in 2005, under a Bush administration initiative, local groups were given direct grants, much to the chagrin of Egyptian officials.

Is Capitalism Good or Bad?

Module 1 Discussion Question
The ideology of capitalism condones self-interest, and valorizes and validates competition among firms and individuals. Although in principle, self-interest is different from greed, avarice, selfishness, etc., perhaps condoning self-interest encourages many people to cross the fuzzy line between self-interest and greed.
For instance, the United States is widely regarded as a leading exemplar of capitalism, and some Europeans characterize the United States as an "elbow society" (in German, Ellbogen-Gesellschaft), i.e., a nasty country in which most people constantly strive to advance economically and socially by knocking others aside and down. In Asia, many have a similar view of Hong Kong.
What do you think? Does capitalism make people more selfish? Are people in the U.S. and Hong Kong more selfish and greedier than people elsewhere?
In your answer, try to compare countries in which you have lived or traveled; and/or bring to bear examples from history or perspectives from other social sciences such as anthropology, psychology, or sociology.
Understand “capitalism” to be an economic system with two main characteristics. First, most physical capital, i.e., the “means of production,” is directly or indirectly owned by households rather than owned collectively, i.e., owned directly by the government and indirectly by all citizens. Second, the classic decisions concerning what to produce, how to produce it, and for whom to produce are decided mostly by households and firms freely interacting in markets.
Capitalism may include a welfare state with the characteristics above, but in addition with substantial taxation and transfers from rich to poor.

My Answer
The ideology of capitalism can release me from compunction I might feel when I 'win' at the expense of my neighbor – giving me a psychological tool to justify my own greed and selfishness. I may convince myself that those who call me selfish 'just don't understand economics' while I 'know better' and am actually optimally contributing to the public good. So 'capitalism' doesn't make people more selfish, but living in a society where we all compete by default that is organized legally to embrace capitalism makes it likely that each individual will embrace guilt-free capitalism too, raising the risk of falling in to selfishness. However, there is a psychological opt-out, many Americans might not be selfish, greedy or embrace consumerism, though they nevertheless sail in the same capitalist ship.
Are people in the US and Hong Kong greedier? I prefer to say many Americans and Hong Kongers pursue their financial self-interest more vigorously, deliberately (we've really made a science of it) and with less compunction or shame than many others. They are more ambitious. Korea is another example, after the Korean war, the transition from collectivism to capitalism began. By the 70s many Korean businessmen were still loyal to family, friends, neighbors and business partners even if it meant sacrificing their individual self-interest. However, in the last 20 years, Korean collectivist loyalty and nepotism has eroded and many Koreans now see ruthless competition, even with their own brother, as the key to success. Koreans' conceptions of the 'family' used to include uncles, grandparents, cousins but this conception of us has shrunk to the nuclear family. China is also going through mass psychological transition now, purging the shame and social stigma of capitalist behavior. So, yes, on average there is more greed in the US and Hong Kong and more self-justification of such greed but with sufficient regulation this greed' can be harnessed for the common good with its harmful excesses kept in check, this is policy makers' job (defining 'sufficient' is the big question).
One reason for Korean success was that the masses gradually decided they really wanted to be rich – grinding poverty, hunger and humiliation at hands of foreign powers were great motivators too – and they had the cultural work ethic to get there. By contrast, I've witnessed similar grinding poverty in Mexico, Brazil and Egypt but there is not the same deep desire among the masses to become rich as in East Asia. In Mexico and Egypt, many people will forego a better job and income to stay close to their family or to work with friends or to maintain the family business. So ambition for wealth is not uniform or universal, though most capitalists take for granted that it is.
Another example. In Egypt there is a sense of guilt and reluctance to fire an unproductive employee asking 'but what will his family do without his income?' even if it means less profit. Whereas a capitalist might matter-of-factly say 'deal with it I hope you learned a lesson' when firing. Most Americans would not have their feelings hurt if a friend said 'sorry I have work to do, I can't talk now' but most Egyptians would be hurt by this 'selfish coldness.' So these are deeply cultural and deeply political questions. Many Americans take competition for granted, but many Egyptians dont see life as a competition (big reason why they are 'losing' the economic competition, they aren't even trying to win). One major misconception in anti-capitalist thinking, especially in Egypt, is that capitalism is just a complete, immoral free-for-all, whereas in reality extensive regulatory legislation and ethics undergird the 'free' market. It is just that, in contrast to the Soviets, who tried to centrally regulate from armchairs, American economic regulation was more empirically based, emerging piece by piece in response to real-world economic crises.
In a democracy, the degree to which the masses embrace capitalist ideology is intimately intertwined with popular conceptions of where the line between us and them is drawn. In capitalist Sweden for example there is considerable ethnic, cultural and linguistic homogeneity, enabling mass support (willingness to pay higher taxes) of a large Swedish welfare state. In America, the massive population and ethnic, cultural, linguistic heterogeneity does not enable mass popular support of a welfare state. A black McDonald's employee in Alabama may feel little or no solidarity with a Chinese-American immigrant in Seattle, precluding wide support of a welfare state in the USA. Cultural and demographic factors shape the role of government as the battle between economic and political forces and between political left and right plays out. RESPONSES Classmate Response
I believe capitalism does encourage greed and selfishness, as Prof. Larson suggests, but the mechanism at work is different from the one that Prof. Larson described in his introduction. Though the “ideology of capitalism” does indeed “valorize[] and validate[] competition,” I believe the impact of this ideology on the behavior of individuals in capitalist societies is less significant than then impact of a related, but distinct, characteristic of capitalist societies, namely the inequality that results from the rapid accumulation of wealth.
Capitalist economic systems are undoubtedly the most efficient at generating wealth, but this wealth will often be distributed unevenly. Highly unequal societies breed selfishness and the intense desire for wealth and social status. I believe that pressure to “keep up with the Joneses” motivates people much more powerfully than simply the valorization of self-interest in the abstract. If one is surrounded by extremely rich people, then one will perceive oneself to be poor (or, at least, not rich enough), even if one is objectively very rich compared to average living standards around the world, let alone throughout human history.
Contemporary China, though nominally still a socialist society, is now widely understood to be a hotbed of unfettered capitalism, complete with extremes of wealth and privilege. My experience in China largely confirms that it is a hyper-competitive “elbow society.” A recent story in the media—in which local citizens stepped over an injured man in the street, while only a foreigner stopped to offer him help—was widely discussed on the Chinese Internet and neatly encapsulates how many Chinese people view the contemporary state of their society .
 My conversations with Chinese nationals suggests they believe that their society was not always so un-compassionate. I have often heard Chinese friends reminisce about their childhoods, when they and everyone they knew were desperately poor, but when people were willing to share what little they had, and they felt a stronger sense of community and solidarity with neighbors.
It’s hard to know if these reminiscences truly reflect the reality of China in an earlier era, but I believe there is at least kernel of truth to these sentiments. My experience is that poor societies, which are often non-capitalist economies, often do not display the kind of selfishness evident in rich, capitalist societies. The people of Laos, for example, are remarkably generous and laid back. When everyone around is poor, there is no pressure to keep up with the Joneses. When an economy is stagnant and present few opportunities to accumulate wealth, people will not compete intensely with each other because the stakes are low. And when one sees no possibility to escape from poverty, sharing with a neighbor will seem more attractive, since one will remain poor no matter what.
My Response
Interesting angle. As I understand, you're saying that capitalist ideology itself is less important than the social pressure on relatively poor people to keep up with the wealthier Joneses. I am not convinced you can separate the two. I feel that capitalism is a game and capitalist ideology defines the rules of the game. The score (our relative wealth) tells us who is winning and who is losing. I agree that seeing you're really losing the game usually comes first and causes us to join the game and embrace capitalist ideology to catch up with the Joneses. But I don't think we can say losing the game is more important than the rules of the game. It seems to me like they are two sides of the same coin, realizing you're losing may be the trigger but embrace of capitalist ideology is necessary to join the game and compete so both are necessary and powerful.

And I agree that in China greed and selfishness have been embraced at the expense of community and solidarity but I think it might just be a natural stage of development and the transition to capitalism. The pendulum has swung to an extreme in China because of the greed and jealousy aroused by great inequality and this has caused an unfettered embrace of the ideology of capitalism. I suspect this happened in America too during industrialization. Generations later, a strong anti-capitalist ideological movement has emerged in America. I doubt there is much of an ideological anti-capitalist movement in China yet (though there probably is a lot of anti-capitalist sentiment I bet it is from poor Chinese personally adversely affected by capitalism, so its self-interest based not ideologically based). I think an ideological backlash will soon begin to mitigate China's unfettered capitalism if it isn't happening already.

And I agree that in countries like Laos where there is neither capitalist ideology or the jealousy engendered by seeing a neighbor's shiny new car, there is less greed and selfishness. Laotians are not playing the individualistic capitalist game (more of a communal, familial game?) so of course they don't care about winning a game they're not playing.

Overall I'd add that I disagree that capitalism encourages greed and selfishness. Prudent regulations of capitalism (not like in China) can, at least legally, curb and punish the harmful excesses of greed and selfishness. Then whether or not individual greed and selfishness increase or not is a result of socio-cultural factors and individual choices – not a result of the underlying economic structure (which is just an efficient way to allocate resources). In other words, I view capitalism as a great way to organize a nation's economic system (because it acknowledges the reality of human nature without succumbing to it entirely) but not a great ideology on which to base my personal code of ethics.

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OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR

Cairo’s Roundabout Revolution

Berkeley, Calif.
IT has become fashionable to refer to the 18-day Egyptian uprising as the “Facebook revolution,” much to the dismay of the protesters who riveted the world with their bravery in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. But revolutions do not happen in cyberspace, even if they start there. What happened in Tahrir Square during the revolution and the protests happening there now show that even in the 21st century, public space remains the most important arena for dissent and social change.
Tahrir Square’s rise to prominence is a testament to how place and history can come together unexpectedly. Although its Arabic name means “liberation,” and although it is one of the oldest squares in modern Cairo, Tahrir never carried much meaning for Cairenes until recently.
In fact, the idea of the public square as we know it today did not exist in Egypt or in the cities of the Middle East until colonial times; open spaces were historically situated in front of the main mosque, to accommodate overflow crowds and religious festivals.
The demonstrations that began in Tahrir Square in January with demands for the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak continue today with protests of the Egyptian military’s management of the revolution’s aftermath. Indeed, the interim Egyptian cabinet recently issued a decree criminalizing demonstrations, on the ground that they disrupt the economy, and two protesters in the square were killed last weekend by security forces.
In many ways, it seems an accident of history that Tahrir Square has become a locus of protest and repression. But a closer look reveals that the square’s geography and structures, including the burned buildings and pockmarked pavements now engraved in the minds of people all over the globe, embody the shifting political currents of modern Egypt as it encountered colonialism, modernism, Pan-Arabism, socialism and neoliberalism.
To the south of the square stands the Mugamma, a bulky, Soviet-style structure that has long been a symbol of Egypt’s monumental bureaucracy. (No Egyptian was able to avoid a trip to that building, in which government offices issued everything from birth certificates to passports.) Overlooking Tahrir Square on the west are the headquarters of the Arab League, with its Islamic architectural motifs, and the former Hilton, the city’s first modern hotel (and soon to be a Ritz-Carlton). Just north of the hotel lies the salmon-colored Egyptian Museum and, behind it, the headquarters for Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, with its monotonous Modernist facade left charred by a fire set during this year’s protests.
The city’s various rulers and regimes, from the pharaohs to Mubarak, have woven themselves in Cairo’s urban fabric. When the Fatimid regime established el-Qahira (Cairo is the Anglicized version of that name) in the 10th century, the Nile ran a different course than it does today. The area that later became Tahrir Square was marshland. By the time Napoleon occupied Cairo at the end of the 18th century, the land had dried up enough to allow the French forces to camp there. But it was not for several decades more, until the time of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, that engineers were able to stabilize the Nile’s banks enough to allow the square to be born as a green field.
The 500-acre open space was home to cultivated fields, gardens and several royal palaces during Khedive Ismail’s reign, from 1863 to 1879. Ismail, the grandson of Muhammad Ali, came to be known as the founder of modern Cairo.
Having lived in Paris as it rebuilt itself into a city of broad boulevards and roundabouts, Ismail embarked on a similar project of modernizing Cairo during the 1860s. Both a district and the square that eventually became Tahrir were initially named Ismailia in his honor.
Ismail’s modernization projects plunged the country into great debt, and he was ousted by foreign forces in 1879. The British occupation of Egypt soon ensued, lasting into the mid-20th century. The British stationed their troops west of the square in Ismailia, in what Egyptians often called the English Barracks.
In the early 20th century, the Ismailia district became downtown Cairo and expanded toward the square, which was redesigned with a roundabout at the southern end to improve the flow of cars. A few decades later, during the reign of King Farouk, the square acquired a large empty pedestal that Cairenes who lived through those years still remember with great nostalgia. Farouk had commissioned a statue of his grandfather, Khedive Ismail, but by the time it arrived years later, reverence for the monarchy had given way to the Egyptian Republic and nascent Pan-Arabism — and the statue never took its place on that pedestal. The Arab League headquarters, a symbol of this new era and ideology, was constructed at the western side of the square and became a monument to the dream of Arab unity.