Understanding the American Right





Ron Schiller, the executive caught in the hidden-camera sting, says NPR, which gets less than 2 percent of its budget from federal funds, would be 'better off.' But for rural stations, the figure can be 30 percent or higher.

NPR executive Ron Schiller says it would be better off in the long run not receiving federal money, which he says only accounts for 2 percent of budget. But what about all the smaller stations he admits would go dark as a result?
Gingold Nicholas/SIPA/Newscom
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By Peter Grier, Staff writer / March 8, 2011
Could NPR thrive without federal funds? A now-former NPR executive said as much on a hidden-camera video released Tuesday by a conservative activist.
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“Frankly, it is clear that in the long run we would be better off without federal funding,” said Ron Schiller, who was head of NPR’s foundation at the time the video was shot.
Asked why that might be so, Schiller said that the loss of federal money would increase NPR’s independence and end confusion among other donors about how much Uncle Sam supports public radio.
However, he cautioned that without Washington’s cash a number of rural stations would “go dark.”
The video was shot by provocateur James O’Keefe, who specializes in trying to lure those he deems liberal over the edge into outrageous and/or criminal behavior. It shows Schiller and another NPR executive meeting with two men who purport to represent a Muslim organization that wants to donate money to NPR.
On the tape Schiller blasts tea party members as “racist” and “xenophobic,” besides arguing for federal defunding of his own organization.
Republicans eager to trim the federal budget have seized on the video as evidence supporting their drive to zero out money for public broadcasting efforts.
“Not only have top public broadcasting executives finally admitted that they do not need taxpayer dollars to survive, it is also clear that without federal funds, public broadcasting stations self-admittedly would become eligible for more private dollars on top of the multi-million dollar donations these organizations already receive,” House Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia said in a statement issued Tuesday.
NPR itself released a statement saying it was “appalled” by Schiller’s comments. It noted that in an unrelated move Schiller has already left NPR to take another job.
But what about the money thing? How do top NPR executives talk about that when they’re not on hidden cameras?
The argument they make is kind of subtle: Federal funds are a small percentage of our budget, but we really, really need them anyway.

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Protesters in Tahrir Square after Hosni Mubarak stepped down last month.

Why Egypt has to be the U.S. priority in the Middle East

     Protesters in Tahrir Square after Hosni Mubarak stepped down. 

By Robert Kagan and Michele Dunne
Monday, March 7, 2011

With the horrific carnage in Libya, the flames of revolution burning inYemen and Bahrain, and protests for political change in Jordan and Morocco, there's a danger that the United States and Europe may lose sight of what still has to be our highest priority in the region: helping the people of Egypt complete their transition to democracy and a new chance at prosperity.
Why is Egypt so important? Because it is the heart of the Arab world. It was the birthplace of pan-Arabism under Gamal Nasser, the linchpin of Middle East peace under Anwar Sadat. With more than 80 million people - as many as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria combined - it has a large and vigorous civil society, feisty, independent media, a broad array of political forces, and a well-respected judiciary. If Egypt can make the transition to democracy, it will lead the way to a new era for the Arab world. If Cairo falls back to dictatorship of one variety or another, it is unlikely the rest of the region will move on without it. The Arab Spring will live or die in Egypt.
The Obama administration is right to be wary of wielding a too-heavy hand. Egyptians are proud and capable and don't want a made-in-America democracy. We particularly need to avoid trying to dictate what kinds of groups can take part in Egypt's democratic process.
But there are important kinds of help that we can provide - above all, economic assistance. As in Eastern Europe, the first wave of enthusiasm for democracy will give way to questions about how well this form of government can deliver the goods.
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What Egyptians most want from us is smart, targeted and timely assistance. Actions that could be taken immediately include:
l Debt forgiveness: Egypt owes billions of dollars to the United States and Europe. This debt should be forgiven or at least substantially reduced.
l Free trade: The Bush administration came close to beginning free-trade negotiations with Egypt in 2005 but backed away because of Hosni Mubarak's repression of political rivals. Once there is an elected Egyptian government that respects citizens' rights, the United States should offer such negotiations as an incentive for that government to adopt a free-market economic philosophy. In the meantime, Washington can offer a preferential trade agreement, which Congress could pass immediately.
l Rethink the U.S. assistance package. The administration has requested for the next fiscal year the same aid as before Mubarak's fall. Although it makes sense to give at least as much to a democratizing Egypt as we did to an authoritarian one, this is not the time for policy on auto-pilot. The administration should discuss with Egypt's political leaders shifting the balance toward more economic and less military aid. The military ought to be happy to show the Egyptian people it is willing to give them a bigger share of American aid.
l Private investment. Sens. John McCain and Joseph Lieberman recently returned from Egypt with a clear message: The Egyptians need and want foreign companies to come and invest in their country. The senators have proposed sending a delegation of high-tech executives to Egypt and Tunisia. The administration ought to help make this happen.
l Appoint a special Middle East transition czar. To oversee all these efforts, the administration is going to need a high-powered individual at the White House, someone with the domestic and international clout to pull together the efforts of the Pentagon, State Department, Treasury and Commerce, as well as the private sector and foreign aid. The U.S. government is not currently equipped to manage this process.
The United States also needs to show consistent support, publicly and privately, for protesters' ongoing pro-democracy demands. They are asking to slow down the breakneck pace Egypt's military leadership has set for elections and want to reform internal security services to ensure that torture and intimidation cease. Egypt can and should hold presidential elections this fall - there is a danger in waiting too long to let the Egyptian people choose their own leaders. But parliamentary elections should wait until a more open and balanced political playing field has been created. Throughout the process, the United States and Europe need to provide appropriate technical and financial assistance.
Whether the Arab Spring succeeds or fails is ultimately up to the peoples of the region. But that is no excuse for the United States and other democratic nations not to help in every way we can. The Egyptian people harbor justified resentment that the United States backed the repressive and often-brutal Mubarak regime for so long; they question our commitment to helping them enjoy the same freedoms that we do. The United States should make sure that we aid the transition now underway so that there is no room for doubt. History will not be kind if we blow this opportunity.
Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, writes a monthly column for The Post. Michele Dunne is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are co-chairs of the nonpartisan Working Group on Egypt.

Egyptian Uprising: Al-Azhar’s Changing Position


The uprising in Egypt and the triumph of its people over the regime has put the role of Al-Azhar, one of the most renowned learning institutions in the Muslim world, into question. As it adjusts itself following Mubarak’s downfall, will it motivate other religious institutions in the region to do the same?
By Afif Pasuni and Faeza Abdurazak
AL-AZHAR University has long been a revered institution in the Sunni Muslim world and is arguably the most influential Islamic institution in the world. One of its missions is the study of the Islamic religion and culture – hence its Fatwa Council that renders religious edicts on submitted queries that come from the world over. Its opinions and religious edicts have always been highly regarded and respected by Muslims globally. Ever since its establishment in the 10th century CE, Al-Azhar has always enjoyed financial independence and earned its revenues from its religious endowments funds (awqaf).
However, the stature of Al-Azhar was somewhat marred when it was nationalised by the secularising regime of the late Egyptian President Gamel Abdel-Nasser in 1961. Article 103 of the Constitution of Egypt that deals with the election of the Al-Azhar Grand Sheikh – the highest seat in Al-Azhar – was amended to be appointed by the President of Egypt. The religious endowments (awqaf) were made part of the state and became the Ministry of Awqaf earlier in 1952. The position of the Grand Sheikh was sponsored by the regime, which ultimately means the office holder has to balance between being a government official and an independent scholar, understandably leading to some critics classifying the institution as “hardly independent”.
Azharites in the Uprising
Egypt
Egypt
In the Egyptian demonstrations, the current Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Ahmed Al-Tayyib, has been very careful in his stance. A day after Mubarak made the televised speech that he would not be running for another term, Al-Tayyib urged the Egyptian people to avoid violence and bloodshed, urging dialogues between representatives of the demonstrators and the government. While his stance resonated with the classic Sunni position – that obedience to the state, even a tyrant, is preferred over anarchy – it has nevertheless placed him at the opposite spectrum of other ulamas in Egypt.
On the other hand, the official spokesman of Al-Azhar, Mohammed Refah El-Tahtawy, reacting to the events that were unfolding, resigned and joined the demonstrations at Tahrir Square. Reports mentioned that he called for the immediate investigation into the clashes that have killed several and injured hundreds by then. Al-Azhar Scholars’ Front, a group that dates back to the 1940s and has mostly been strongly opposed to the perceived pro-government opinions and fatwas issued by the leadership of Al-Azhar, released scathing remarks against Mubarak and called for his resignation.
Before the resignation of Mubarak, Al-Azhar also saw its former student Muhammad Jebril, a renowned Islamic scholar, leading the Friday prayers at Tahrir Square. More prominently, the prodigal son of Al-Azhar, Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who has spent his life in exile in Doha, Qatar, returned to Egypt to lead the Friday prayers at Tahrir Square a week after Mubarak’s departure. He has been a strong critic of Al-Azhar as a whole, from the educational structure to its financial dependency on the government, but he is also a man whose Azharite identity is an essential part of him. He has been very vocal in lending his support for the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and now Libya.
The strong opposing stance from these Azharites against the status quo of Al-Azhar leadership, especially El-Tahtawy’s resignation, gives an insight into the voices of dissent and opposition within the campuses against the institution’s stance, which is perceived to be weak. It also exposed the fissures between the leadership and the public at the lower level of hierarchy. Leading Al-Azhar officials who expressed disagreement over the demonstrations include Saeed Amer, the Head of the Fatwa Council of Al-Azhar. Yet such calls are muted by the images of Al-Azhar scholars marching in Tahrir Square in their distinctive garb of grey robes and white-red turbans.
A Shifting Position?
After Mubarak’s fall, Al-Azhar scholars gathered in front of the Ministry of Awqaf demanding that the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar be chosen through an election and not a presidential appointment, as it has historically been so. In a press conference, the Grand Sheikh Al-Tayyib backs this demand and states that he is ready to elect the Grand Sheikh. He also defended Al-Azhar’s stances as being original and not tainted by politics, saying that the institution is “above governments and revolutions”.
Given the recent triumph of the Egyptian people over the regime, there is no better and more interesting time to see what changes the oldest and most revered Islamic institution will bring in light of the fast-changing order in the region. Initial indications are pointing towards a change, as Al-Tayyib noted the near future will see “freer religious speech”. Al-Azhar should take charge of its future just as Egypt has done and regain its foot in the collective memory of Muslims by allowing independent scholarship to expand and flourish.
Where open dissent by established Muslim clerics is generally rare in the region, the tsunami of awakening has rallied the masses, including the ulamas. A similar trend is visible in other parts of the region. For instance Libya’s own Islamic leaders, under the umbrella of Network of Free Ulama of Libya, have issued a fatwa telling all Muslims it is their duty to rebel against the Libyan leadership and to demand the release of all jailed protesters. If and when popular revolts triumph, institutions – including religious ones – will be disengaged from the unseated rulers. It is thus likely that Al-Azhar’s shifting position may motivate similar trends in the region.
Afif bin Pasuni is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University and an alumnus of Al-Azhar University. Faeza Abdurazak, an RSIS alumna, is a Research Assistant at the Middle East Institute (MEI), National University of Singapore.

About the author:
RSISRSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the author/s are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, which produces the Commentaries.